Defacing Democracy?: The Changing Nature and Rising Importance of As-Applied Challenges in the Supreme Court\u27s Recent Election Law Decisions by Persily, Nathaniel & Rosenberg, Jennifer S.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
2009
Defacing Democracy?: The Changing Nature and
Rising Importance of As-Applied Challenges in the
Supreme Court's Recent Election Law Decisions
Nathaniel Persily
Jennifer S. Rosenberg
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Persily, Nathaniel and Rosenberg, Jennifer S., "Defacing Democracy?: The Changing Nature and Rising Importance of As-Applied
Challenges in the Supreme Court's Recent Election Law Decisions" (2009). Minnesota Law Review. 556.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/556
  
1644 
Article 
Defacing Democracy?: The Changing 
Nature and Rising Importance of As-
Applied Challenges in the Supreme 
Court’s Recent Election Law Decisions 
Nathaniel Persily† 
Jennifer S. Rosenberg‡ 
In its first three years, the Roberts Court has issued a se-
ries of important election law decisions on topics ranging from 
gerrymandering and voter identification to regulation of politi-
cal parties and campaign finance.1 The substance of those deci-
sions has been dramatic enough, but the decisions also illu-
strate the evolution of important constitutional and election 
law doctrines concerning facial and as-applied challenges. The 
Court has clarified its strong preference for as-applied chal-
lenges in the election law context2 just as it has in others, such 
 
 † Charles Keller Beekman Professor of Law and Political Science, Co-
lumbia Law School. 
 ‡  Voting Rights and Elections Fellow, Brennan Center for Justice at the 
New York University School of Law. The views expressed herein are those on-
ly of the authors and not reflective of the organizations with which they are 
affiliated. Thanks to Richard Briffault, Christopher Elmendorf, Jamal Greene, 
Richard Hasen, Gillian Metzger, Trevor Morrison, and participants in work-
shops at Rutgers-Camden and the University of Minnesota Law Schools for 
helpful comments. Copyright © 2009 by Nathaniel Persily and Jennifer S. Ro-
senberg. 
 1. See Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009); Davis v. Fed. Elec-
tion Comm’n, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2765 (2008); Riley v. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 1970, 
1976–77 (2008); Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. 
Ct. 1184, 1187 (2008); N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres, 128 S. Ct. 
791, 795 (2008); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 
2659 (2007); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 
2598 (2006); Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2497, 2485 (2006). See generally Na-
thaniel Persily, Fig Leaves and Tea Leaves in the Supreme Court’s Recent Elec-
tion Law Decisions, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (analyzing the Ro-
berts Court’s election law cases decided between 2007 and 2008). 
 2. See Persily, supra note 1 (manuscript at 22–23).  
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as abortion cases.3 The effect of these decisions appears to have 
been to make some types of voting rights claims more difficult 
to bring, but perhaps the more important development is the 
evolution in what the Court means by an as-applied or facial 
challenge. 
For the most part, those who favor a more aggressive judi-
cial role in protecting constitutional rights also worry about 
judicial timidity in favoring as-applied over facial challenges.4 
For impact litigators, the litigation costs often exceed the bene-
fits of securing narrow victories for their clients through a se-
ries of effective as-applied challenges.5 In the election law con-
text, additional concerns further distort this cost-benefit 
calculus. This is a context in which clear rules need to be 
known in advance and in which plaintiffs often have little in-
centive to bring challenges once the injury on election day has 
occurred. A victory for individual voting rights plaintiffs is 
quite often a pyrrhic one, if applied to a narrow class of plain-
tiffs and only after the winner of the election has been deter-
mined. 
This Article examines the evolution in the doctrine con-
cerning facial and as-applied challenges and considers the im-
plications of the Roberts Court’s preference for as-applied chal-
lenges to statutes regulating elections. This Article argues that 
the renewed emphasis on as-applied challenges masks other 
strategies and arguments concerning how inconvenient 
precedent can be overturned and how the Court should stay its 
hand when the factual record supporting a challenge requires 
further development. Part I sets forth the basic doctrine con-
cerning as-applied and facial challenges. Part II sketches out 
two exceptions to the general rule concerning facial chal-
lenges—First Amendment and abortion rights—that have also 
undergone some transformation in recent cases. Part III dis-
cusses the Roberts Court’s recent election law cases, which 
have dealt with this issue to a surprising extent. Part IV 
presents our conclusions and considers whether election law 
 
 3. See Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 
46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 272 (1994).  
 4. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court—Foreword: Leaving Things 
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 39 (1996) (labeling minimalists and maximal-
ists as those who prefer as-applied and facial challenges respectively).  
 5. Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional 
Doctrine and the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 
YALE L.J. 2, 34 (2008) (“Reliance on as-applied challenges may . . . entail sig-
nificant litigation costs for litigants and courts.”). 
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cases should be one more arena in which the requirements for 
bringing a facial challenge should be relaxed. Finally, Part V 
presents an epilogue that considers the constitutional challenge 
to the Voting Rights Act (VRA) that the Court was considering 
as this Article went to press. 
Before delving into the case law—both historic and re-
cent—we should admit to two caveats that should govern any 
critique of the doctrine in this area. First, as critical as we 
might be of the inconsistency and lack of clarity in the emerg-
ing doctrine, we must recognize that this is precisely the type of 
constitutional domain directly affected by the effort to build 
consensus among Justices of conflicting views. In other words, 
when Justices disagree as to how to answer the core constitu-
tional questions in these cases, playing loose with these 
“second-order” doctrines may provide one avenue to crafting a 
decision that speaks for a Court majority or even supermajori-
ty.6 In two of the three recent election cases upon which we fo-
cus (the Indiana voter ID case7 and the Washington nonparti-
san primary case),8 the lopsided decisions can be attributed to 
such strategies. Therefore, the caustic criticism of dissents and 
commentators (ourselves included) ought to be tempered by 
recognition of the real-world challenges to achieving a clear de-
cision from a multimember body. 
Second, as we reiterate several times in this Article, these 
seemingly technical doctrinal moves cannot be extracted from 
the substantive constitutional debates present in these cases. 
Although we may focus at times on the propriety of as-applied 
or facial review of a particular dispute, the resolution of these 
second-order questions is intimately tied to the primary ques-
 
 6. Indeed, the strategic use of the as-applied/facial distinction to achieve 
consensus was patently clear in the transition period when Justice Alito was 
replacing Justice O’Connor. In two cases we later discuss, Ayotte v. Planned 
Parenthood of Northern New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006) (remanding for as-
applied challenge to a law requiring parent notification for abortions), and 
Wisconsin Right to Life v. Federal Election Commission, 546 U.S. 410 (2006) 
(per curiam) (remanding for as-applied challenge to electioneering communi-
cations restrictions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act), the Court issued 
unanimous opinions in what would otherwise seem controversial cases lending 
themselves to split decisions. Indeed, once Wisconsin Right to Life went back 
to the full Court, it split five to four. In both of those cases, the remands for 
hearings on as-applied challenges allowed the Court to stall and avoid decid-
ing a controversial case while the Court was awaiting a transition in member-
ship. 
 7. Crawford v. Marion County, 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008). 
 8. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184 
(2008). 
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tions over the constitutional bounds on election laws in the giv-
en domain. Relying on the facial/as-applied distinction may of-
ten appear like a strategy for avoiding the deeper constitutional 
inquiries involved. Yet the choice made at this branch on the 
constitutional decision tree almost always reflects some posi-
tion as to the desired outcome in such cases in general. Thus, 
while we may concentrate on the significance of favoring one 
type of constitutional attack over another, this debate often 
represents a proxy war of sorts over the central constitutional 
values at stake. 
I.  THE BASIC DOCTRINE CONCERNING AS-APPLIED 
AND FACIAL CHALLENGES   
We begin, however, with the basics. A plaintiff can chal-
lenge the constitutionality of a statute in two principal ways. 
The more ambitious approach—a facial challenge—requires 
that a plaintiff prove that the statute is unconstitutional in all 
(or nearly all) of its applications.9 After finding a statute to be 
facially unconstitutional, courts void the statutory provision so 
as to make it unenforceable against anyone.10 The less ambi-
tious, and therefore often more successful approach—an as-
applied challenge—alleges that the statute is unconstitutional, 
given a particular set of facts and as applied to a particular 
plaintiff and others similarly situated.11 The remedy for an as-
applied challenge will vary somewhat depending on the nature 
of the allegation, but, if doing so is consistent with the meaning 
and intent of the statute, a court will excise the plaintiff and 
those similarly situated from the statute’s constitutional reach 
by effectively severing the unconstitutional applications of the 
statute from the unproblematic ones.12 These definitions neces-
sarily gloss over the theoretical controversies explored later in 
 
 9. See Dorf, supra note 3, at 236; Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Over-
breadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 
359, 365 (1998).  
 10. See Dorf, supra note 3, at 236.  
 11. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 1081 (16th ed. 2007) (“Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a sta-
tute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the 
courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its 
improper applications on a case-by-case basis.”). 
 12. See id. (“If a law restricting speech is invalidated as applied to a pro-
tected speaker, it is held inapplicable to that speaker, and thus, in effect, judi-
cially trimmed down.”). 
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this Article, but this rudimentary, even if assumed, distinction 
serves as a good jumping-off point. 
The preference for as-applied challenges, which is hardly 
unique to the Roberts Court,13 arises from concerns about judi-
cial restraint and respect for the work of politically accountable 
branches.14 The strongest weapon a federal court can wield is 
its power to declare an act of a legislative body unconstitution-
al. A series of doctrines counsels against the use of that power 
unless absolutely necessary. For example, federal courts avoid 
constitutional questions unless answering them is essential to 
deciding the challenge at hand and even then, sometimes ab-
stain if important enough interests counsel against resolution 
of the issue at that time.15 Similarly, the “case or controversy” 
requirement leads federal courts to avoid deciding cases that 
are moot or unripe.16 The preference for as-applied challenges 
derives from an analogous impulse: to strike down as little of a 
law as possible so as to salvage the constitutional parts of the 
law for which either the people or their representatives voted.17 
In some cases, deleting (in effect) a few words from the statute 
is the most scalpel-like approach to curing a constitutional de-
fect18 whereas in others carving out an exception for a particu-
 
 13. See Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 
219–20 (1912) (finding that a statute “as applied to cases like the present” was 
valid); see also Douglas Kmiec, Facing Consensus: The Importance of the “Fa-
cial” vs. “As Applied” Distinction in the Roberts Court, SLATE, Apr. 29, 2008, 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/blogs/convictions/archive/2008/04/29/facing-
consensus-the-importance-of-the-facial-versus-as-applied-distinctions-in-the-
roberts-court.aspx (suggesting that the Roberts Court is furthering a trend 
that the Rehnquist Court began). 
 14. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 
(2008) (“Exercising judicial restraint in a facial challenge ‘frees the Court not 
only from unnecessary pronouncement on constitutional issues, but also from 
premature interpretations of statutes in areas where their constitutional ap-
plication might be cloudy.’” (quoting United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 
(1960))).  
 15. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–48 (1936) 
(listing seven reasons why the Court might avoid resolving constitutional is-
sues). 
 16. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997) (“‘No principle is more fun-
damental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government than the 
constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or contro-
versies.’” (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 
(1976))). 
 17. See Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1191 (“[F]acial challenges 
threaten to short circuit the democratic process by preventing laws embodying 
the will of the people from being implemented in a manner consistent with the 
Constitution.”). 
 18. Cf. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504–05 (1985) 
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lar plaintiff serves those values.19 When the statute is not 
amenable to such a construction or a given plaintiff is not cha-
racteristically different from anyone else who might challenge 
the law, voiding the law on its face may be the only appropriate 
remedy to vindicate the constitutional rights at stake. 
Of course, the key question remains when, if ever, facial 
invalidation is appropriate—that is, what does a plaintiff need 
to prove to have a law voided on its face? The so-called Salerno 
standard established that “the challenger must establish that 
no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be va-
lid.”20 In addition to what appear to be acknowledged excep-
tions to the Salerno principle discussed in the following sec-
tions, the Court has tacitly embraced facial challenges in a 
range of constitutional contexts, both in individual rights cases 
and in litigation questioning the proper scope of congressional 
power.21 At times, the Court has looked the other way by strik-
ing down laws on their face without even acknowledging the fa-
cial nature of a challenge, or pausing to consider whether the 
statute would, in fact, be unconstitutional in all circumstances. 
Those who wish to make facial challenges easier worry that 
incremental, as-applied adjudication provides a less effective 
means for protecting many individual rights.22 The Salerno 
principle, they argue, ignores strategic justifications for prefer-
ring facial over as-applied invalidation in certain settings.23 For 
 
(rejecting a facial challenge to a moral nuisance statute and holding that the 
proper solution was not to strike down the entire statute, but rather to elimi-
nate its problematic language, namely the word “lust,” in the statutory defini-
tion of “prurient”). 
 19. Cf. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985) (declaring a Ten-
nessee statute invalid only to the extent that it authorized police to use deadly 
force against unarmed felons).  
 20. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (emphasis added). 
 21. See Dorf, supra note 3, at 294. 
 22. See id. at 240 (criticizing the Salerno rule as vastly inefficient in light 
of the “wide gulf [that] separates the statute that might operate unconstitu-
tionally under some conceivable set of circumstances from one that operates 
unconstitutionally under all circumstances”); David H. Gans, Strategic Facial 
Challenges, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1333, 1336 (2005) (“A facial challenge may be . . . a 
better means of implementing the Constitution than requiring parties to 
mount a series of as-applied challenges because of the costs of case-by-case ad-
judication.”).  
 23. See Gans, supra note 22, at 1336; see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 
190, 193–94 (1976) (“[A] decision by us to forgo consideration of the constitu-
tional merits in order to await the initiation of a new challenge to the statute 
by injured third parties would be impermissibly to foster repetitive and time-
consuming litigation under the guise of caution and prudence.”). 
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example, facial invalidation may be most effective for laws that 
have a “chilling effect” on the exercise of certain constitutional 
rights.24 If the chief effect of such laws can be seen in individu-
als’ avoidance of constitutionally protected behavior, then as-
applied litigation brought by injured plaintiffs seeking indivi-
dualized, scalpel-like judicial remedies will not address the 
principal constitutional harm such laws cause. The same can be 
said for statutes that risk discriminatory application by confer-
ring excessive discretion on enforcement authorities. For such 
laws, addressing individual occurrences of discriminatory en-
forcement through as-applied challenges might do little to ad-
dress the underlying constitutional risks that the law 
presents.25  
The putative “on-off toggle” between facial and as-applied 
challenges glosses over serious disagreements among judges 
and academics concerning how courts behave when they invoke 
these doctrines.26 Most efforts to parse out a coherent facial-
 
 24. See Dorf, supra note 3, at 277 (supporting the notion that facial chal-
lenges are necessary to guard against the “chilling” of various fundamental 
rights); see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 938–40, 945–46 (2000) 
(finding that the Nebraska law chilled second trimester abortions); Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 843, 893 (1992) (holding a sta-
tute unconstitutional after finding that it would deter a “significant number” 
of women from procuring abortions).  
 25. See Gans, supra note 22, at 1361–62 (discussing Louisiana v. United 
States, in which the Court struck down Louisiana’s literacy test on the ground 
that it subjected voters to the “passing whim or impulse of an individual regi-
strar” (quoting Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 153 (1965))); see also 
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999) (finding that the challenged 
statute created a risk of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement by police of-
ficers, a factor that counseled in favor of facial invalidation); Grayned v. City 
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972) (finding that facial invalidation is 
warranted where a law’s vagueness “impermissibly delegates basic policy mat-
ters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective 
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory applica-
tion”). Professor David Gans also suggests that the specter of facial invalida-
tion can spur legislators into action, especially where successful facial chal-
lenges would have “momentous consequences,” such as where an entire 
sentencing regime or redistricting plan would be nullified. David H. Gans, Se-
verability as Judicial Lawmaking, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 639, 692 (2008) (of-
fering examples of instances where the Court stayed facial invalidation of a 
statute in order to give lawmakers an opportunity to fix its constitutional de-
fect).  
 26. See Dorf, supra note 3, at 294; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and 
Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1323 
(2000) (“[I]t is tempting to say that the Justices of the Supreme Court are not 
only divided, but also conflicted or even confused, about when statutes should 
be subject to facial invalidation.”); Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and 
Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 880–83 (2005). But see Isserles, supra 
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challenge doctrine recognize that, notwithstanding Salerno, the 
categories of facial and as-applied challenges are not mutually 
exclusive.27 All statutory challenges actually fall somewhere 
along a continuum bookended by facial challenges that ask 
courts to invalidate entire statutes and “pure” as-applied chal-
lenges that ask courts to invalidate fact-specific instances of en-
forcement.28 Moreover, the expansiveness of the appropriate 
remedy will often depend on the applicable, substantive doc-
trinal test, given that different constitutional claims necessari-
ly require different types of relief.29 
Finally, as Gillian Metzger has argued, “the debate regard-
ing the availability of facial challenges [becomes], at bottom, 
fundamentally a debate about severability.”30 In other words, 
the appropriateness of narrow versus broad relief depends not 
only on the applicable substantive doctrine or the uniqueness of 
the plaintiff ’s injury, but also on whether the statute under re-
view is capable of judicial “editing” to remedy the harm de-
 
note 9, at 395–415 (arguing that despite its critics, the Salerno principle is 
neither draconian nor inconsistent with the Court’s facial challenge practice). 
 27. See David M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing: The Paradox of Demand-
ing Concrete Context for Formalist Adjudication, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 808, 
884–87 (2004); Fallon, supra note 26, at 1324 (“[T]here is no single distinctive 
category of facial, as opposed to as-applied, litigation.”).  
 28. Compare Fallon, supra note 26, at 1326 (arguing that every litigant 
challenging a statute is inherently asserting that it cannot be enforced against 
them and therefore that all constitutional challenges “are in an important 
sense as-applied”), with Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral 
Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 157 (1998) 
(“There is no such thing as a true as-applied constitutional challenge.”), and 
Matthew D. Adler, Rights, Rules, and the Structure of Constitutional Adjudi-
cation: A Response to Professor Fallon, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1371, 1387 n.56 
(2000) (“‘[A]s-applied’ challenges in one sense (challenges that vindicate the 
personal rights of claimants) do not exist, but . . . ‘as-applied’ challenges in a 
different and weaker sense (challenges that make reference to facts about the 
claimant, which in turn I construe as partial invalidations of rules) do exist.”). 
See generally Driesen, supra note 27, at 859–62 (summarizing the Adler-
Fallon debate). 
 29. See Driesen, supra note 27, at 883–85 (exploring the continuum of 
judicial decision making between as-applied and facial challenges in different 
areas of law). 
 30. Metzger, supra note 26, at 886–87; see also Alfred Hill, Some Realism 
About Facial Invalidation of Statutes, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 647, 664 (2002) (ar-
guing that there has never been an instance of the Court striking down an en-
tire statute that had both valid and invalid components). See generally Fallon, 
supra note 26, at 1368 (discussing the tension between facial challenges and 
the severability doctrine and observing that because valid subrules can usual-
ly be severed from invalid ones, “it is often unnecessary for a court to adjudge 
the validity of a statute ‘on its face’; it is enough to determine whether a valid 
subrule applies to a particular case”). 
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scribed in a given case. Even the most narrow relief that ad-
dresses a single plaintiff ’s particular constitutional wrong is 
unavailable if the statute expressly refuses to contemplate an 
exception for such a context.31  
II.  EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE CONCERNING 
FACIAL AND AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES   
A.  FIRST AMENDMENT  
The Court has long recognized First Amendment over-
breadth doctrine as an exception to the Salerno rule concerning 
facial challenges.32 Under First Amendment overbreadth doc-
trine, litigants may seek facial invalidation of a statute that re-
stricts expression, regardless of whether the litigant herself 
was engaging in protected speech at the time the statute was 
enforced against her.33 In other words, the doctrine eclipses 
traditional standing rules by allowing a litigant to assert the 
rights of hypothetical third parties, without any need to estab-
lish that the statute at issue is unconstitutional as-applied.34 
The primary justification for First Amendment over-
breadth is that even laws that regulate unprotected speech are 
likely to chill the exercise of protected speech by individuals 
swept into their regulatory ambit.35 As-applied challenges 
 
 31. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 
321 (suggesting that the critical underlying inquiry is: “Would the legislature 
have preferred what is left of its statute to no statute at all?”); see also John 
Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203, 258–59 (1993) (“Some sta-
tutory provisions are the product of compromises that would be disrupted if 
one part was allowed to stand as another part fell; such statutes should be 
nonseverable.”). 
 32. See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118 (2003) (“The First 
Amendment doctrine of overbreadth is an exception to our normal rule regard-
ing the standards for facial challenges.”).  
 33. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972) (“Although a statute 
may be neither . . . overbroad, nor otherwise invalid as applied . . . against a 
particular defendant, he is permitted to raise its . . . unconstitutional over-
breadth as applied to others. And if the law is found deficient . . . it may not be 
applied to him either . . . . [It] is stricken down on its face.” (quoting Coates v. 
City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 619–20 (1971))). 
 34. See Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 
(1987) (“Under the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, an individual 
whose own speech or conduct may be prohibited is permitted to challenge a 
statute on its face ‘because it also threatens others not before the court . . . .’” 
(quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 (1985))).  
 35. See Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 581 (1989); Note, The First 
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 910 (1970). Compare 
Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 21–30 (arguing 
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might vindicate the rights of individuals who suffer specific in-
juries from an unconstitutional statute, but the mere existence 
of such a law on the books will lead constitutionally protected 
speakers to alter their behavior.36 The concerns about a chilling 
effect on protected speech reverse the normal presumption in 
favor of judicial restraint and to some extent replace it with a 
presumption against constitutionality once an infringement on 
speech can be demonstrated. 
It nevertheless should be acknowledged that the Court has 
rolled back a bit from its more capacious definitions of over-
breadth. It has done so in two ways. First, as is generally true 
with constitutional avoidance doctrine, courts will attempt to 
find a limiting construction that saves the statute from an un-
constitutionally overbroad definition.37 When they do so, courts 
redefine what the law means on its face rather than merely ex-
cising the unconstitutional applications of the law. At times 
that may seem like more of a stylistic difference, especially giv-
en what was said earlier about the interaction with severability 
doctrine. The effect, however, is to prohibit all the unconstitu-
tional applications of the statute by adopting an interpretation 
 
that First Amendment overbreadth flows automatically from substantive First 
Amendment law, namely the requirement that laws regulating speech be the 
least restrictive means of accomplishing their stated goals, rather than from 
any special standing rules or nonseverability presumption), with Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 867–75 (1991) 
(maintaining that the justifications for the doctrine vary with the type of 
speech being regulated), and Martin H. Redish, The Warren Court, the Burger 
Court, and the First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 
1031, 1032 (1983) (critiquing the chilling-effect theory).  
 36. The accepted justifications for First Amendment overbreadth doctrine 
can be just as relevant in other contexts, and the mechanics of the doctrine 
equally applicable. Professor Dorf asserts that the same chilling effect theory 
that justifies First Amendment overbreadth doctrine has and should justify 
extending it to all “nonlitigation fundamental rights.” Dorf, supra note 3, at 
268–71. He also observes that the substantiality requirement used to curtail 
the scope of First Amendment overbreadth has also been used “for quite some 
time” to limit overbreadth elsewhere, including in abortion cases. Id. at 276; 
see also Monaghan, supra note 35, at 37–38 (arguing that overbreadth analy-
sis should be applied “wherever the Supreme Court is serious about judicial 
review”).  
 37. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112 (1990); Edward J. DeBartolo 
Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 
(1988) (“[E]very reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a 
statute from unconstitutionality.” (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 
657 (1895))); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) (“Facial over-
breadth has not been invoked when a limiting construction has been or could 
be placed on the statute.”).  
 1654 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:1644 
 
that cures the constitutional defect while not striking down the 
entire provision.  
Second, the Court has moved toward a test for “substantial 
overbreadth,” which would require that a plaintiff in a facial 
challenge prove more than that the statute is unconstitutional 
in an extraordinary or conceivable case.38 Although “‘substan-
tial overbreadth’ is not readily reduced to an exact definition,”39 
the Court has considered laws to be substantially overbroad if, 
when “judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate 
sweep,”40 “a substantial amount of protected speech is prohi-
bited or chilled in the process.”41 Substantial overbreadth pre-
vents a declaration of facial unconstitutionality in the event the 
plaintiff can drum up some hypothetical person or class whose 
speech rights will be chilled or infringed upon. It seems to re-
quire that the amount of constitutionally protected speech af-
fected by the law be significant or substantial enough that the 
regulation of a great deal of unprotected speech or conduct can-
not be justified. 
B.  ABORTION RIGHTS 
The Salerno Court maintained that it had never recognized 
an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited scope of the First 
Amendment.42 However, the Rehnquist Court’s abortion rights 
cases represent one area where the Court implicitly endorsed 
such an approach, and one where the Roberts Court has begun 
to harmonize abortion cases with its general preference for as-
 
 38. See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 122 (2003) (rejecting an 
overbreadth attack against a state trespass law where the underlying trespass 
policy, “taken as a whole,” was not substantially overbroad); Broadrick, 413 
U.S. at 615.  
 39. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 (1984). 
 40. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769–71 (1982) (quoting Broadrick, 
413 U.S. at 615). 
 41. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 237 (2002). 
 42. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). But see Sabri 
v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609–10 (2004) (acknowledging that the Court 
has “recognized the validity of facial attacks alleging overbreadth (though not 
necessarily using that term) in relatively few settings,” including abortion and 
the Fifth Amendment right to travel); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 359 
n.8 (1983) (suggesting that facial attacks are proper whenever a statute reach-
es “a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct”); RICHARD H. 
FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S 
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 12 (Supp. 2005) (questioning 
whether there is “any principled explanation of when the Court will entertain 
overbreadth facial challenges and when it will not”).  
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applied challenges.43 As Professor Fallon observed prior to 
Chief Justice Roberts’s tenure, “[v]irtually all of the abortion 
cases reaching the Supreme Court since Roe v. Wade . . . have 
involved facial attacks on state statutes, and the Court, wheth-
er accepting or rejecting the challenges on the merits, has . . . 
typically accepted this framing of the question presented.”44 In 
cases where these challenges succeeded on the merits, the 
usual result was an injunction gutting the entire challenged 
provision, regardless of whether it had some constitutional ap-
plications.  
For example, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey, the Court reached the merits of a facial chal-
lenge without any mention of Salerno and invalidated on their 
face portions of a Pennsylvania statute which would have oper-
ated as an undue burden in “a large fraction” of cases.45 More 
recently, in Stenberg v. Carhart, the Court struck down Ne-
braska’s entire so-called “partial birth abortion” statute on the 
ground that its lack of a health exception for the pregnant 
woman would lead to numerous unconstitutional applications 
of the statute.46 Given their inconsistency with the Salerno 
 
 43. See Dorf, supra note 3, at 272 (asserting that Roe v. Wade “exemplifies 
overbreadth analysis”). 
 44. Fallon, supra note 35, at 859 n.29 (citation omitted); see also Stuart 
Buck, Salerno v. Chevron: What to Do About Statutory Challenges, 55 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 427, 432 (2003) (“A doctrine parallel to that of First Amendment over-
breadth has emerged in the abortion context.” (citing Planned Parenthood of 
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992))). But see H.L. v. Matheson, 450 
U.S. 398, 405–06 (1981) (finding that the plaintiff, an unmarried fifteen-year-
old girl who lived with her parents, lacked standing to facially attack a state 
statute requiring parental notification). Some commentators have argued that 
Casey implicitly overruled Salerno, at least with respect to reproductive 
rights. See, e.g., Pammela S. Quinn, Note, Preserving Minors’ Rights After Ca-
sey: The “New Battlefield” of Negligence and Strict Liability Statutes, 49 DUKE 
L.J. 297, 314 (1999) (“Casey implicitly replaced the Salerno test with the ‘un-
due burden’ standard in the abortion context by its application of that stan-
dard.”).  
 45. 505 U.S. at 895. Casey also underscores the need for litigants alleging 
non-First Amendment overbreadth to provide evidentiary support for their 
challenge. In Casey, the Court assessed the factual record associated with each 
challenged provision of the Pennsylvania statute. Id. at 884–85, 887, 901. 
Since the law’s challengers failed to proffer evidence demonstrating that the 
statute’s twenty-four-hour waiting period would rise to the level of being a 
“substantial obstacle” for any woman seeking an abortion, the Court upheld 
that requirement. Id. at 886–87. By contrast, there was a detailed factual 
record establishing that the spousal consent provision would create an undue 
burden for almost one percent of women seeking abortions, and accordingly 
the Court sustained that facial attack. Id. at 893–95.  
 46. 530 U.S. 914, 929–30 (2000). The Court also found a second, indepen-
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standard, such cases led Justice Scalia later to excoriate the 
majority for creating a “political correctness” exception to the 
ordinary rule governing facial challenges.47  
Beginning with Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern 
New England, the Roberts Court breathed new life into Salerno 
by rejecting, as a procedural matter, a facial overbreadth chal-
lenge to a New Hampshire statute regulating abortions.48 The 
Court avoided the merits of the question—whether New Hamp-
shire could require parental notification without accommodat-
ing immediate threats to the pregnant woman’s health49—and 
instead turned its attention to the remedy being sought.50 Writ-
ing for a unanimous Court, Justice O’Connor reaffirmed that 
the “‘normal rule’ is that ‘partial, rather than facial, invalida-
tion is the required course.’”51 She also attempted to distin-
guish Stenberg, writing that the only reason why the Court in-
validated the entire Nebraska statute was because no litigant 
had asked for, and the Court “did not contemplate, . . . relief 
more finely drawn.”52  
A year after Ayotte, the Court reaffirmed its commitment 
to rolling back the abortion overbreadth exception.53 In Gon-
zales v. Carhart, a 5-4 majority reversed the Eighth and Ninth 
Circuits’ wholesale invalidations of the Partial Birth Abortion 
Act of 2003.54 Both circuits had struck down the Act as uncons-
 
dent reason to invalidate the law, in that it “unduly burden[ed] the right to 
choose abortion itself.” Id. at 930. 
 47. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 81 (1999) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting). 
 48. 546 U.S. 320, 323, 329 (2006). 
 49. 546 U.S. at 323–24. 
 50. Id. at 328. 
 51. Id. at 329 (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 
504 (1985)). 
 52. Id. at 331. Stuart Buck observes that although the parties in Stenberg 
may not have asked the Court to save the Nebraska statute by merely sever-
ing or narrowly construing its problematic provisions, at least one amicus brief 
did request such relief. See The Buck Stops Here, The Ayotte Case, 
http://stuartbuck.blogspot.com/2006/01/ayotte-case.html (Jan. 20, 2006, 11:34 
EST) (stating that an amicus brief filed by Feminists for Life had in fact asked 
the Court for a narrow interpretation of the statute). 
 53. See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Modest Hope for a Modest Roberts 
Court: Deference, Facial Challenges, and the Comparative Competence of 
Courts, 59 SMU L. REV. 1735, 1751, 1757–60 (2006) (arguing that the compar-
ative competence of courts strongly cautions against facial adjudication and 
predicting that with the succession of Justice O’Connor by Justice Alito, the 
Court would move further in that direction).  
 54. 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1619, 1639 (2007). Justice Ginsburg, writing for the 
dissenters, voiced alarm at the majority’s blatant “refus[al]” to take seriously 
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titutional because it failed to include a provision that would 
have permitted the controversial procedure in circumstances 
necessary to protect the health of the mother.55 In overturning 
the circuits, the Court declared the Act impervious to facial 
challenges, given that the “latitude” (overbreadth) afforded 
First Amendment cases was inapplicable.56 As if the point 
needed further underscoring, the Court added that the facial 
challenges in issue “should not have been entertained in the 
first instance.”57 For the first time, the Court explicitly rejected 
the notion that all restrictions on abortion procedures require 
health exceptions, stating that wherever a factual dispute ex-
ists as to whether a statute poses significant health risks to 
women, the proper mode of judicial review is case-by-case.58 
With respect to the evidence proffered to demonstrate an “un-
due burden” on a woman’s right to have an abortion, the Court 
found that the challengers failed to show that the act “would be 
unconstitutional in a large fraction of relevant cases.”59  
 
precedent that not only countenanced the facial invalidation of statutes lack-
ing health exceptions, but also endorsed the general availability of facial chal-
lenges in the abortion setting. Id. at 1641. 
 55. See Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163, 
1172 (9th Cir. 2006), overruled by Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007); 
Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 803 (8th Cir. 2005), overruled by Gonzales 
v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). The Ninth Circuit also found the Act im-
permissibly vague and unduly burdensome on a woman’s right to choose a 
second trimester abortion. See Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., 435 F.3d at 
1176, 1180–81. 
 56. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1638–39. 
 57. Id. at 1638. 
 58. See id. at 1638–39. Although the Court left the door open for as-
applied challenges to the Act, it appears as though none followed. See Edward 
Whelan, The Mystery of the Missing Lawsuits: One Year After the Supreme 
Court’s Partial-Birth-Abortion Ruling, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Apr. 18, 2008, 
http://article.nationalreview.com/print/?q=MjU3MmU2YmU4ZjAwNDVkY2Nl
OWJkNWE4NThlMGE0MWM= (claiming that no as-applied challenges have 
since been brought).  
 59. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1639 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992)). In light of the Roberts Court’s retraction of 
the abortion overbreadth exception, one article suggests that reproductive 
rights advocates might fare better by bringing lawsuits predicated on the 
“purpose” prong of Casey’s undue burden test. See Note, After Ayotte: The 
Need to Defend Abortion Rights With Renewed ‘Purpose,’ 119 HARV. L. REV. 
2552, 2565 (2006). But see Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) 
(imposing an evidentiary burden on litigants claiming improper motive on the 
part of a legislature). 
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III.  THE SPECIAL CONTEXT OF ELECTION LAW   
The emphasis on as-applied challenges as the preferred 
method of challenging unconstitutional state action has been 
particularly salient in recent election law cases. In the context 
of campaign finance, regulation of political parties, and voter 
identification requirements, the opinions of the Roberts Court 
have discussed the as-applied/facial issue to a degree never be-
fore seen in an election law case. These cases illustrate the ten-
sion in the evolution of the relevant constitutional jurispru-
dence, while at the same time they force us to ask whether the 
election law context, like the First Amendment and abortion 
rights contexts, should be treated as special for some reason. 
A.  WISCONSIN RIGHT TO LIFE 
Perhaps the largest transformation in election law during 
the Roberts Court has occurred in the area of campaign 
finance. The replacement of Chief Justice William Rehnquist 
and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor with Chief Justice John Ro-
berts and Justice Samuel Alito flipped a fragile 5-4 majority 
that was deferential to campaign finance reforms to one that 
appears aggressively committed to striking such measures 
down as abridging First Amendment rights.60 In fact, the Ro-
berts Court has struck down all three campaign finance laws it 
has considered.61 “Struck down” might overstate what it has 
done, because in a recent and significant campaign finance de-
cision, the Court vindicated an as-applied challenge that effec-
tively gutted the relevant provisions of the law. 
In Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life 
(WRTL), the Court struck down Title II of the Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) as applied to an advertise-
ment that asked voters in Wisconsin to call their Senators to 
tell them to confirm President Bush’s judicial nominees.62 The 
law prohibits the airing of such advertisements, funded by cor-
porate treasury funds, within sixty days of a general election if 
 
 60. See Persily, supra note 1 (manuscript at 15–18) (discussing the Ro-
berts Court’s campaign finance decisions). 
 61. See Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2766, 2775 (2008) 
(striking down the so-called Millionaire’s Amendment to the Bipartisan Cam-
paign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA)); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life 
(WRTL), 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2007) (striking down BCRA express advocacy 
provisions as applied to certain types of ads); Randall v. Sorrell 126 S. Ct. 
2479, 2485 (2006) (striking down Vermont’s expenditure and contribution lim-
its).  
 62. See WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2659–61. 
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they “refer[] to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office” 
(the so-called “primary definition” of electioneering communica-
tions).63 A pro-life organization called Wisconsin Right to Life 
(WRTL) paid for the ad with corporate funds and the ad men-
tioned by name Senator Russ Feingold, who was up for reelec-
tion,64 so it was captured by the law. However, the Court consi-
dered the ad protected-issue advocacy, instead of a less-
protected electioneering communication,65 and also held that 
the law was unconstitutional as-applied to any similar ad un-
less the ad was “susceptible of no reasonable interpretation 
other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candi-
date.”66 The Court split into three camps: Chief Justice Ro-
berts’s controlling opinion (joined by Justice Alito) struck down 
the law as-applied;67 Justice Scalia’s concurrence (joined by 
Justices Thomas and Kennedy) would have struck down the 
law on its face;68 and Justice Souter’s dissent (joined by Justic-
es Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer) would have upheld the law 
both as-applied and on its face.69 
Unlike the other opinions we will soon discuss, WRTL is 
notable for its vindication of an as-applied challenge, as op-
posed to its reservation of as-applied challenges en route to de-
nying a facial challenge. Generally, we think of as-applied chal-
lenges as carving out exceptions to a largely constitutional 
statute.70 However, the WRTL decision strikes down the law as 
applied to most of the advertisements to which it was di-
rected.71 Most corporate-funded advertisements that run within 
sixty days of a general election and that refer to candidates 
running for office are susceptible to some interpretation other 
than appeals to vote for or against those candidates.72 Indeed, 
 
 63. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f )(3)(A)(i) (2006), declared unconstitutional as applied 
by WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2652. 
 64. WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2660–61, 2663. It also mentioned Senator Herb 
Kohl, who was not up for reelection. See id. at 2699 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 65. See id. at 2659, 2663. 
 66. Id. at 2667. 
 67. Id. at 2658. Justice Alito also wrote separately to emphasize that if 
the standard in the controlling opinion proved unworkable, he would also 
strike down the law on its face. See id. at 2674 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 68. See id. at 2674, 2686–87. 
 69. See id. at 2687, 2698–99, 2704–05. 
 70. See Persily, supra note 1 (manuscript at 30). 
 71. See WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2659. 
 72. See, e.g., id. at 2670 (“WRTL’s ads may reasonably be interpreted as 
something other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate 
. . . .”). 
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the reason Congress passed such a sweeping corporate speech 
code was that the “magic words” standard of Buckley v. Valeo 
proved so easy to get around.73 Ads would end with an exhorta-
tion to “call your member of Congress to tell them how you 
feel,” instead of an appeal to vote a particular way, but the 
message was still clear.74 
In McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, the Court 
upheld Title II of BCRA on its face, but, in a footnote, left open 
the possibility of as-applied challenges.75 The ad at issue in 
WRTL presented such a challenge, but the Court’s decision 
goes much farther than merely holding that particular ad pro-
tected. It created the “susceptible of no reasonable interpreta-
tion” standard for as-applied challenges to BCRA going for-
ward.76 This blew a huge hole in the law’s primary definition of 
electioneering communications while pretending not to revisit 
or undermine the central holding of McConnell77 and while at-
tempting merely to reconcile conflicting precedent concerning 
the anti-corruption interest necessary to justify bans on corpo-
rate treasury-funded ads.78 
 
 73. See id. at 2692, 2702 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976)) (“This construction would restrict the application 
. . . to communications containing express words of advocacy of election or de-
feat, such as ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Con-
gress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ or ‘reject.’”). 
 74. See CRAIG B. HOLMAN & LUKE P. MCLOUGHLIN, BUYING TIME 2000: 
TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN THE 2000 FEDERAL ELECTIONS 29–36, 71–73 
(2001) (noting the prevalence of group-sponsored issue ads and arguing that a 
sixty-day bright-line test would offer a more precise standard for defining elec-
tioneering activity); JONATHAN S. KRASNO & DANIEL E. SELTZ, BUYING TIME: 
TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN THE 1998 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 9 (2000). 
The “Buying Time” studies became a source of great controversy in the 
McConnell litigation, so much so that Chief Justice Roberts went out of his 
way in WRTL to minimize their significance. See 127 S. Ct. at 2665 & n.4 
(mocking the “student coders” of McConnell’s evidentiary record). 
 75. 540 U.S. 93, 157 n.52, 224 (2003).  
 76. WTRL, 127 S. Ct. at 2667. 
 77. Id. at 2659 (“[I]n upholding § 203 against a facial challenge, we did 
not purport to resolve future as-applied challenges.” (citation omitted)); see al-
so id. at 2664 (“This Court has already ruled that BCRA survives strict scruti-
ny to the extent it regulates express advocacy or its functional equivalent. So 
to the extent the ads in these cases fit this description, the FEC’s burden is not 
onerous; all it need do is point to McConnell and explain why it applies here.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 78. The Court reconciles McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 
U.S. 93 (2003), Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 
(1990), and First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), so as to come 
to the conclusion that the unique anticorruption interest does not extend 
beyond corporate-funded express advocacy of the election of candidates. 
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Although traditionally conceived as growing from impulses 
of judicial restraint, as-applied challenges can also provide an 
opportunity, as shown in WRTL, for the sometimes dramatic 
reworking of both judicial precedent and statutory meaning. It 
is very difficult to reconcile the holding of WRTL with the 
Court’s rejection of the facial challenge to Title II in McCon-
nell.79 Perhaps it is so obvious that it need not be said, but this 
vindication of the as-applied challenge can best be explained as 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito’s rough compromise be-
tween fidelity to precedent (stare decisis) and their fundamen-
tal disagreement with McConnell’s holding. The as-applied 
holding allows them to carve an exception to the law that is as 
large as the legislative record justifying it: most of the “objec-
tionable” ads that formed the core justification of Title II’s 
sweeping regulation turn out to be constitutionally protected. 
By striking down this law as applied to the facts of this ad and 
all others satisfying the “no reasonable interpretation” stan-
dard, the Court can say that BCRA Title II is constitutional in 
theory, but rarely in practice. Moreover, as Justice Alito’s sepa-
rate opinion states, the new as-applied standard allows for the 
possibility that further challenges will demonstrate its unwor-
kability and prove the necessity of overturning the law on its 
face.80 
Completely unmentioned in the controlling opinion is the 
fact that Title II of BCRA had its own built-in way to accommo-
date Roberts and Alito’s misgivings: a backup definition of elec-
tioneering communications would be triggered if the primary 
definition were held unconstitutional. In the event the primary 
definition of electioneering communications (the “refers to a 
clearly identified candidate” standard) were declared unconsti-
tutional, Title II provided a secondary definition: 
any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which promotes or 
supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate 
 
WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2672 (“These cases did not suggest, however, that the in-
terest in combating ‘a different type of corruption’ extended beyond campaign 
speech.”). 
 79. See Richard L. Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court’s Dere-
gulatory Turn in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1064, 
1103–08 (2008) (noting the tension between McConnell’s overbreadth holding 
and the reasoning of WRTL). 
 80. WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2674 (Alito, J., concurring) (“If it turns out that 
the implementation of the as-applied standard set out in the principal opinion 
impermissibly chills political speech, we will presumably be asked in a future 
case to reconsider the holding in McConnell that § 203 is facially constitution-
al.” (citation omitted)). 
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for that office (regardless of whether the communication expressly 
advocates a vote for or against a candidate) and which also is sugges-
tive of no plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or 
against a specific candidate.81 
However, because it limits itself to the law as applied to those 
plaintiffs, the WRTL holding did not technically trigger the 
backup definition.  
From the standpoint of as-applied doctrine or jurispru-
dence, the Court’s decision to redefine the primary definition of 
electioneering, rather than to strike it down and trigger the 
backup, is peculiar along several dimensions. The remedy to an 
as-applied challenge depends, in part, on severability of the re-
levant statute—that is, the Court carves out an exception for 
the plaintiff while remaining true, if possible, to the purpose of 
the statute.82 However, WRTL guts the primary definition of 
electioneering and substitutes its own definition, which is very 
close, but not precisely the same, as the backup definition.83 In 
doing so, the Court rewrites a law that does not need to be re-
written and does so in a way that Congress specifically avoided. 
The normal preference for as-applied challenges arising from 
considerations of judicial restraint is completely inapposite 
here when Congress has clearly expressed its preference in leg-
islation and the Court’s sweeping exception swallows the legis-
lative rule while adopting a third option for which no one voted. 
Given the similarities in impact between the Court’s new 
standard and the backup definition, it becomes even more diffi-
cult to characterize the decision as truly an as-applied holding. 
It is difficult to think of an ad that could be regulated under the 
Court’s definition of electioneering (one capable of no reasona-
ble interpretation other than an exhortation to vote for or 
against a candidate84) but that would not be regulated under 
the statute’s backup definition (which covers all ads that both 
are incapable of no other “plausible meaning” other than an ex-
hortation to vote for or against and also promote, support, at-
tack, or oppose a candidate).85 If that is right, then the Court 
actually struck down the primary definition on its face by carv-
 
 81. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f )(3)(A)(ii) (2006), declared unconstitutional as applied 
by WRTL, 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007). 
 82. See Persily, supra note 1 (manuscript at 30). 
 83. Compare WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2667 (creating the “susceptible of no 
reasonable interpretation” standard), with 2 U.S.C. § 434(f )(3)(A)(ii) (setting 
forth the “susceptible of no plausible meaning” standard). 
 84. See WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2667. 
 85. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(f )(3)(A)(ii). 
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ing out all possible applications of the primary definition that 
would not have been covered by the secondary definition. 
Finally, there is no mention at all in the controlling opinion 
that the First Amendment standard for facial challenges differs 
from that for the run-of-the mill constitutional case. As noted 
above, “substantial overbreadth” is the most that would be ne-
cessary to strike down a speech restriction on its face.86 It is 
almost as if campaign finance (or perhaps election law more 
generally) were viewed as an exception to the First Amendment 
exception to facial challenges. Surely, the logic of the opinion 
and a cursory look at the legislative record suggest that, at a 
minimum, a “substantial number” of the applications of the 
primary definition of electioneering are unconstitutional, 
“judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”87  
B.  WASHINGTON STATE GRANGE 
This last critique of WRTL—that it ignores the uniqueness 
of the facial/as-applied distinction in the First Amendment con-
text—can also be lodged against the Court’s 7-2 decision in 
Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Par-
ty.88 There, the Supreme Court rejected a facial challenge to 
Washington’s modified blanket primary system, which allowed 
any candidate to express a “party preference” on a unified pri-
mary ballot.89 The parties argued that this represented forced 
association in violation of the First Amendment because voters 
would assume the party had endorsed, nominated, or asso-
ciated itself with such a candidate, when it might specifically 
want to disavow such a candidate.90 The Supreme Court re-
jected the facial challenge but left open the door to future as-
applied challenges once the state had crafted an actual ballot in 
which a plaintiff could show voter confusion.91 
Washington State Grange illustrates the interrelationship 
or slippage between the as-applied doctrine and the doctrines of 
ripeness and constitutional avoidance. The deficiency in the fa-
cial challenge brought by the parties there was not that it 
failed, per se, to prove that the law was unconstitutional in all 
 
 86. See supra Part II.A. 
 87. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769–771 (1982) (quoting Broa-
drick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)).  
 88. 128 S. Ct. 1184 (2008). 
 89. Id. at 1187. 
 90. Id. at 1189. 
 91. Id. at 1195. 
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its applications. Rather, the challenge failed because the law 
had not yet been applied at all, so it was unclear if it would be 
unconstitutional in all or any of its applications.92 This is a sub-
tle but important difference. At this preenforcement stage, the 
Court could not strike down the law because it did not know 
what the law actually meant, nor could it discern whether a 
constitutional violation would occur once it was enforced.93 Un-
like the paradigmatic rejection of a facial challenge on the 
grounds that some applications of the law would be constitu-
tional, here the Court suggested that the law might be uncons-
titutional in all of its applications (that is, if it caused voter 
confusion), but such an injury was mere speculation at the time 
the lawsuit was filed.94 
Perhaps more than in any other case—certainly any other 
election law case—the Washington State Grange opinion ex-
plains the rationale for avoiding facial invalidations if at all 
possible. The Court warns about claims of facial invalidity be-
cause they “often rest on speculation” and “raise the risk of 
‘premature interpretation of statutes on the basis of factually 
barebones records.’”95 The majority opinion also extols the vir-
tue of a bias against facial invalidation as arising from general 
principles of judicial restraint (not deciding a constitutional is-
sue unless absolutely necessary and even then crafting as nar-
row a rule as possible) and respect for the democratic process.96 
Therefore, while a law that authentically confused voters as to 
whether a candidate was in fact the party’s nominee or even a 
party member might be unconstitutional, one that merely al-
lowed candidates to state a party preference was not.97 To as-
sess the constitutionality of the law, the Court needed to await 
 
 92. See id. (“Each of the [respondents’] arguments rests on factual as-
sumptions about voter confusion, and each fails for the same reason: In the 
absence of evidence, we cannot assume that Washington voters will be 
misled.”). 
 93. See id.  
 94. See id. at 1193. One other possible interpretation would be that the 
Court, once voter confusion is shown, would only strike down the law as ap-
plied to the party that had been injured by the confusion. That seems implaus-
ible given that such relief would then never cure the constitutional injury. At a 
minimum, the Court might prospectively immunize the party from having 
candidates use its name as a party preference. But it is difficult to see why one 
party would be susceptible to voter confusion as to whom it supports while 
another would not be. 
 95. Id. at 1191 (quoting Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004)). 
 96. Id. at 1191. 
 97. See id. at 1195. 
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both the state’s interpretation and enforcement of the law and 
the concomitant confusion, if any, that it would produce.98 
Rather than describing this decision as one upholding the 
law on its face while reserving the right to strike it down as ap-
plied to some later plaintiff (à la McConnell), it seems more ap-
propriate to say that the Court (despite express language to the 
contrary)99 merely refused to pass judgment on the law because 
the factual record was inadequate to establish a constitutional 
violation. One could describe this as an argument concerning 
ripeness, standing, abstention, or simply the failure of the 
plaintiffs to provide an adequate factual record to demonstrate 
an “injury in fact.” But whatever one calls it, the “upholding” of 
the law against a facial attack was really more about dismiss-
ing the claim because of a lack of information about the law 
and its effects. 
Perhaps the best way to reveal what the Court was really 
doing is to envision what the next case would look like. Suppose 
a Nazi sympathizer runs in the primary and expresses a prefe-
rence for the Republican Party. And suppose that preference is 
expressed by putting an “R” next to his name on the ballot, but 
the ballot in small print at the bottom of the first page (or even 
worse, in some separate ballot pamphlet) indicates that party 
preference designations do not imply any association, member-
ship, or endorsement of the political party.100 And suppose a 
later poll or other study reveals that most voters thought that 
the candidate was endorsed by the Republican Party. The Re-
publican Party brings suit, now having already suffered the in-
jury (suppose, even worse, that candidate wins office so the in-
jury is long-lasting or irreparable). If the party launches a 
successful challenge to the law, can the Court strike down the 
law on its face based on these new developments or could it, at 
most, strike it down as applied to the Republican Party and any 
other party victimized by similar confusion? 
In the traditional way of considering facial invalidity, it 
would appear that the law should be struck down on its face. 
The law is not unconstitutional because of the specific and 
 
 98. See id. 
 99. See id. at 1196 (“[B]ecause there is no basis in this facial challenge for 
presuming that candidates’ party-preference designations will confuse the vot-
ers, [the law] . . . is facially constitutional.”). 
 100. As it turned out, the ballot notation for the 2008 election said “Prefers 
Republican Party” or “Prefers Democratic Party” under the candidate’s name. 
See KITSAP COUNTY, WASH., SAMPLE BALLOT (2008), available at http://www 
.kitsapgov.com/aud/elections/archive/08/sample%20ballot%20gen%202008.pdf. 
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unique harms befalling the Republican Party; we simply know 
more about the meaning of the law and the extent of the poten-
tial injury than we did when the statute stood unenforced. Giv-
en that no remedy the Court could order would retroactively 
undo the harm of the confusion that led to the Nazi-
sympathizing candidate’s election, it makes no sense to suggest 
(as is often the case when considering unconstitutional applica-
tions) that the law was unconstitutional as applied to the Re-
publican Party in the context of a particular candidacy. Any re-
lief must be of a kind that holds this law, as enforced and 
interpreted, unconstitutional as applied to every party for every 
candidate based on the evidence gleaned from that expe-
rience.101 
The Court’s decision rejecting the facial challenge conflates 
two problems: the absence of a ballot (or state court interpreta-
tion) implementing the law and the absence of actual confusion 
arising from whatever ballot format the state employs.102 The 
difference between those two deficiencies in this case is impor-
tant for cases going forward. If the principal problem was the 
Court not knowing what the law would mean and what the bal-
lot would look like, then the decision has a minor effect in the 
run-of-the-mill case in which the meaning of a law is clearer. 
Moreover, a challenge to the law need only wait until the ballot 
is printed, not until voter confusion results in the election of a 
candidate that the party objects to. If the crux of the Court’s 
decision rests on the absence of voter confusion on the record 
before it, then the implications may be more dramatic and 
harmful. The result would be that a party (or rather, the polity) 
must first suffer the injury of voter confusion in an actual elec-
tion before it or any other party can prove the law’s unconstitu-
tionality. 
This is more than a mere academic or semantic point. The 
effect of the Court’s decision is to force plaintiffs to suffer irre-
 
 101. One might say that the Court should strike down, on its face, the in-
terpretation of the law by the state courts or administrative bodies while 
upholding the statute on its face because it could have been interpreted or en-
forced differently. There are two responses to this objection. First, the mean-
ing of a state law for purposes of federal court review includes the state’s defi-
nition and interpretation of the law. Second, even if one believes that the 
Court was, in a technical sense, upholding the statute but striking down its 
interpretation, it is doing both on their face. The Court’s decision will apply to 
all potential plaintiffs because the injury will extend to them based on this 
new knowledge of how the law works. 
 102. See Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1195. 
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parable harm (in this case, confused voters in an election) in 
order to generate evidence as to the law’s unconstitutionality. 
Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence took a different approach, 
which illustrates the problem with the majority’s couching the 
case in the terms of as-applied or facial invalidity. For him, the 
only dispositive question was what the ballot would look like: 
If the ballot is designed in such a manner that no reasonable voter 
would believe that the candidates listed there are nominees or mem-
bers of, or otherwise associated with, the parties the candidates 
claimed to “prefer,” the I-872 primary system would likely pass con-
stitutional muster. I cannot say on the present record that it would be 
impossible for the State to design such a ballot . . . . On the other 
hand, if the ballot merely lists the candidates’ preferred parties next 
to the candidates’ names, or otherwise fails clearly to convey that the 
parties and the candidates are not necessarily associated, the I-872 
system would not survive a First Amendment challenge.103 
If the judge considers confusion to be a likely consequence 
of the ballot design, Roberts would have him strike it down on 
its face without having to wait for actual confusion at the 
polls.104 “Nothing in my analysis,” Roberts wrote, “requires the 
parties to produce studies regarding voter perceptions on this 
score, but I would wait to see what the ballot says before decid-
ing whether it is unconstitutional.”105 
C.  CRAWFORD V. MARION COUNTY ELECTION BOARD 
The Washington State Grange case seemed like an exotic 
election law dispute until a controlling opinion for the Court 
used its holding concerning as-applied challenges as precedent 
for the Court’s most significant election case of the 2007-2008 
Term: Crawford v. Marion County Election Board.106 There, the 
Court upheld Indiana’s voter identification requirement 
against a facial challenge, while expressly reserving the possi-
bility that the requirement might be unconstitutional as ap-
plied to particular plaintiffs in some later case.107 Like Wash-
ington State Grange, however, the opinion is somewhat unclear 
 
 103. Id. at 1197 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 104. See id. 
 105. Id.  
 106. 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1622 (2008) (declaring that Washington State 
Grange’s reasoning “applied with added force” to petitioner’s arguments). 
 107. See id. at 1623 (“[W]e note that petitioners have not demonstrated 
that the proper remedy—even assuming an unjustified burden on some vot-
ers—would be to invalidate the entire statute.”); see also id. at 1623 n.20 (res-
ponding to the dissent’s concern that the law would burden “tens of thou-
sands” of voters by arguing that such concerns were based on “speculation,” 
not “admissible evidence”).  
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as to whether the problem with the plaintiffs’ case was a bad 
set of facts, an inadequate record, poor lawyering, or premature 
adjudication. 
The Court split three ways in Crawford. Justice Stevens 
wrote the controlling opinion for himself, Justice Kennedy, and 
Chief Justice Roberts, rejecting the facial challenge but leaving 
open the possibility of future as-applied challenges.108 Justice 
Scalia concurred, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, arguing 
that the law should be upheld on its face and future as-applied 
challenges should be foreclosed.109 Justice Souter, joined by 
Justice Ginsburg, submitted a dissent, as did Justice Breyer; 
they would have struck down the law on its face.110 
The controlling opinion is somewhat inexact in its assess-
ment of the severity of the burden on voting rights posed by the 
photo ID law and of the number of people for whom it will 
present a severe burden.111 In part, this is a result of what Jus-
tice Stevens finds to be insufficient facts in the record on these 
critical points.112 The plaintiffs did not produce a single person 
who would say that he or she would not vote because of the ID 
requirement.113 The number of Indianans without ID was un-
certain and contested and as to the difficulties faced by the el-
derly and indigent voters in their attempts to obtain ID, “the 
record says virtually nothing.”114 “[E]ven assuming an unjusti-
fied burden on some voters,” the controlling opinion maintains, 
those challenging the law had not demonstrated that facial in-
validation was the proper remedy.115  
Left hanging in the opinion is the question of what type of 
evidence might have been sufficient to warrant striking down 
the law on its face or what future plaintiffs would need to dem-
onstrate to prove the law unconstitutional as applied to 
 
 108. See id. at 1613, 1621. 
 109. See id. at 1625–26 (Scalia, J., concurring) (preferring a “general as-
sessment of the burden” over “voter-by-voter examination”). 
 110. See id. at 1627 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 1643 (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing). 
 111. Id. at 1623 n.20 (majority opinion). 
 112. Id. at 1622 (“[O]n the basis of the evidence in the record it is not poss-
ible to quantify either the magnitude of the burden on this narrow class of vot-
ers or the portion of the burden imposed on them that is fully justified.”). 
 113. Id. at 1614. 
 114. Id. at 1622. 
 115. Id. at 1623 (citing Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 
546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006) and Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican 
Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2008)). 
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them.116 If the opinion really is about the deficiencies in the 
record, then it seems to leave open the possibility that the law 
is both unconstitutional on its face and as-applied to some sub-
set of voters who have difficulty getting a photo ID. At the time 
the district court had heard the challenge to the ID law, no 
statewide election had taken place, and as mentioned before, no 
voter came forward to say he or she would not be able to vote 
because of the law.117 If in a subsequent election it turns out 
that a large number of voters cannot vote because of the ID re-
quirement,118 maybe we will learn that the law is unconstitu-
tional on its face because the State’s anti-fraud interests do not 
justify such an impediment for such a large number of people. 
Or, even if the law is constitutional on its face, perhaps a small 
group of voters (or maybe even just an individual voter) has 
sufficient difficulty getting an ID that they can prove the law 
unconstitutional as applied to them. Such might have been the 
case for the now-famous group of nuns that had difficulty vot-
ing in the Indiana presidential primary.119 
Of course, these options are more theoretical than real, at 
least in the context of the Indiana law. The number of voters as 
to whom one could definitively prove that acquiring a photo ID 
is severely burdensome such that they will not vote almost cer-
tainly does not rise to a level that would justify striking the law 
down on its face.120 This is especially true given the credence 
and significance the Court attributed to the state’s anti-fraud 
 
 116. Soon after Crawford, an Indiana voter brought an as-applied chal-
lenge to the Voter ID Law, this time buttressing the constitutional claims with 
evidence that he personally had to travel a great distance and pay fees in or-
der to obtain a valid state identification. Stewart v. Marion County, No. 1:08-
CV-586-LJM-TAB, 2008 WL 4690984, at *1–3 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 21, 2008). Re-
cently, the district court denied the plaintiff ’s motion for temporary injunctive 
relief on the ground that despite demonstrated inconveniences, the record still 
lacked evidence of “a burden that, on balance, outweighs the State’s interest in 
protecting against voter fraud” under Crawford. Id. at *3. 
 117. See Crawford, 472 F.3d at 952. 
 118. Of course, “how large a number of voters” and “how severe the burden” 
will remain the critical questions. See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616 (reviewing 
prior election cases focusing on the severity of the burden and the number of 
voters affected). 
 119. See Associated Press, Nuns with Dated ID Turned Away at Polls, 
MSNBC.COM, May 6, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24490932/. 
 120. Michael Pitts estimates that approximately 400 voters in the Indiana 
presidential primary election did not have their provisional ballots counted 
because of a failure to present ID. Michael J. Pitts, Empirically Assessing the 
Impact of Photo Identification at the Polls Through an Examination of Provi-
sional Balloting, J.L. & POL. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers 
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1287735. 
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interests.121 And for those voters who face a special burden na-
vigating the bureaucratic hurdles to acquire an ID, launching a 
federal as-applied lawsuit would hardly seem to be an easier 
path to the voting booth.122 
The lack of clarity in the meaning of the Crawford decision 
illustrates unique problems concerning the as-applied/facial 
distinction in voting rights cases. In the ordinary constitutional 
case governed by the Salerno standard, the demonstration of a 
severe burden on the rights of a subgroup disparately affected 
by the law (all else equal) would lead a court to find the law un-
constitutional as applied to that group but not to those for 
whom the law does not present a severe burden. However, the 
constitutional test that comes from Anderson v. Celebrezze,123 
and which the Court applied in Crawford, acknowledges the 
possibility that a severe burden on a minority of people affected 
 
 121. See Persily, supra note 1 (manuscript at 9–12) (discussing the impor-
tance of the Court’s decision regarding the state’s antifraud interests and the 
relationship between that issue and the Court’s consideration of the facial/as-
applied distinction). 
 122. Crawford led lower courts to reject facial challenges with the added 
caveat that as-applied challenges relying on the same constitutional theories 
could potentially succeed. See, e.g., Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 
544 F.3d 976, 979–80 (9th Cir. 2008) (rejecting a facial attack to an Arizona 
immigration statute that had yet to be enforced, but inviting litigants to bring 
future challenges “if and when . . . the factual background is developed” (citing 
Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1621)); Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 530 
(6th Cir. 2008) (declaring facial invalidation inappropriate where the full im-
pact of a statute remained speculative and explaining that it would be “far 
more prudent to ‘await an as-applied challenge’ to decide whether the Act is 
constitutional in a discrete factual setting” (citing Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 
1621–23; Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 
1184, 1184, 1194–95 (2008))); Ray v. Texas, No. 2-06-CV-385, 2008 WL 
3457021, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2008) (upholding a Texas law that prohibited 
the act of signing as a witness to more than one early voting ballot application, 
relying at least in part on the fact that, as in Crawford, the record below 
lacked “concrete evidence” demonstrating a severe enough burden on voter 
participation); cf. Am. Ass’n of People with Disabilities v. Herrera, 580 F. 
Supp. 2d 1195, 1213 (D.N.M. 2008) (rejecting both a facial challenge and an 
as-applied challenge to New Mexico’s statutory restrictions on third-party vot-
er registration drives and citing Crawford for the proposition that plaintiffs 
lodging facial attacks may bear a heavy burden of persuasion). The most sig-
nificant and telling post-Crawford voting rights opinion may be Florida State 
Conference of the NAACP v. Browning, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1237 (N.D. Fla. 
2008) (rejecting a facial challenge to Florida’s voter-registration law requiring 
a matching verification process). Cases concerning the added burdens placed 
on voters mismatched in voter registration lists will become more prevalent in 
the continuing debate over voter fraud and access. 
 123. 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). 
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by the law could still justify facial invalidation of the law.124 
Such was the case when the Court struck down a poll tax on its 
face rather than simply ruling that it was unconstitutional as 
applied to poor people.125 In Crawford, the controlling opinion 
held that the petitioners failed to prove that the law posed “‘ex-
cessively burdensome requirements’ on any class of voters.”126 
Therefore, if the plaintiffs in a future case could demonstrate a 
severe burden on at least some voters, the Court would then 
need to answer whether the class of severely burdened voters 
was sufficiently large to outweigh the state’s antifraud inter-
ests and whether the proper remedy would be invalidating the 
statute or simply protecting the burdened voters by striking it 
down as applied to them. 
The potential effect of the Court’s facial holding was not 
lost on Justice Scalia, who thought that the only constitutional 
question was the impact of the photo ID requirement on voters 
generally, not any subgroup in particular.127 He derided the 
controlling opinion as relying on a “record-based resolution of 
these cases.”128 For him, the fact that the law applied to every-
one and had no invidious discriminatory purpose was the end of 
the matter.129 The burden on all voters was the same, even 
 
 124. See 128 S. Ct. at 1623 (suggesting a potentially different outcome if 
the majority could have concluded that the statute imposed “excessively bur-
densome requirements”).  
 125. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966). The 
Crawford Court tried to distinguish Harper by suggesting that unlike that 
case, an election-related state interest (preventing fraud) justifies the Indiana 
ID rule whereas a poll tax was unrelated to voter qualifications. See Crawford, 
128 S. Ct. at 1615–16; id. at 1626 & n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[W]e have 
never held that legislatures must calibrate all election laws, even those totally 
unrelated to money, for their impacts on poor voters or must otherwise ac-
commodate wealth disparities.”). Of course, the proponents of the poll tax 
thought it was very relevant to voter qualifications. 383 U.S. at 674 (Black, J., 
dissenting). One might also ask whether, as to the state justification, the tax 
would then be constitutional if used to fund elections, as opposed to fund 
schools as was true in Virginia. See id. at 664 n.1 (majority opinion).  
 126. 128 S. Ct. at 1623 (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 738 (1914)) 
(emphasis added).  
 127. Id. at 1625 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 128. Id. at 1627. 
 129. To hold otherwise “would effectively turn back decades of equal-
protection jurisprudence,” Scalia argued, because “[t]he Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not regard neutral laws as invidious ones, even when their burdens 
purportedly fall disproportionately on a protected class.” Id. at 1626. This is a 
peculiar argument to make in the voting rights context given that the funda-
mental interest prong of equal protection, not the suspect classification prong, 
is the constitutional source for the right to vote. Indeed, this approach would 
itself turn back the clock—effectively overruling a series of cases from Rey-
 1672 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:1644 
 
though some voters, because of their personal situations, felt 
different impacts from the law.130 His discomfort with the spec-
ter of “constant litigation” where the “potential allegations of 
severe burden are endless” suggests that even those voters who 
suffered unique impacts from the law would be out of luck.131 
IV.  AN “ELECTION LAW EXCEPTION” TO THE DOCTRINE 
GOVERNING FACIAL CHALLENGES?   
Justice Scalia’s concurrence did not end with his objection 
to the “record-based resolution”132 of the voter ID case. What he 
next suggested provides a global argument as to why in the 
election law arena the Court should prefer facial challenges to 
as-applied ones. “This is an area where the dos and don’ts need 
to be known in advance of the election,” Scalia explained, “and 
voter-by-voter examination of the burdens of voting regulations 
would prove especially disruptive.”133 Ordinarily one thinks of 
Justice Scalia as pushing in the direction of as-applied chal-
lenges,134 but in all three of the election law cases discussed 
above he would have either upheld (Crawford) or struck down 
(Washington State Grange and WRTL) the laws on their face.135 
Even if one disagrees with where he would come out, his con-
cern as to the costs of as-applied challenges in election law cas-
es should also worry those who would be more receptive to reg-
ulations of campaign finance and party reform and more 
skeptical about voter ID laws. Indeed, as a general matter, the 
as-applied/facial challenge doctrine in the election law arena 
ought to facilitate the development of clear pre-election rules 
 
nolds v. Sims (one person, one vote) to Bush v. Gore (vague intent of the voter 
standard deemed unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause). See 
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 
(1964) (citing Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963)). Justice Scalia ap-
pears to make an exception for poll taxes and candidate filing fees because 
they were related to money, which is a way to distinguish those cases, but not 
explain them. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1626 n.1. 
 130. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1625. 
 131. Id. at 1626.  
 132. Id. at 1627. 
 133. Id. at 1626. 
 134. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 81 (1999) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (criticizing what he referred to as the Court’s “entirely irrational 
exceptions” to the usual restriction on facial challenges); Janklow v. Planned 
Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic, 517 U.S. 1174, 1176 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). 
 135. See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1627; Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State 
Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1198 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting); WRTL, 
127 S. Ct. 2652, 2676 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
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(clarity). The doctrine should also recognize the irreparability 
of the injury that often occurs if the results of an election must 
serve as the record for establishing an individual’s voting rights 
claim (irreparability). Finally, it should acknowledge that the 
costs to the individual (or even to litigators or political parties) 
in bringing a voting rights lawsuit often outweigh the benefits 
of vindicating the individual right to vote (cost). 
Given the breakdown in the as-applied/facial challenge dis-
tinction, it would be sloppy to advocate for greater facilitation 
of facial challenges per se. Whether the Court says it is striking 
down a law on its face or as-applied is less important than its 
adjudication of the case with a concern toward the salient fea-
tures of election law challenges described above: clarity, irrepa-
rability, and cost. Little practical difference usually exists be-
tween a facial challenge that leads to the voiding of a narrow 
statutory provision and an as-applied challenge that leads to 
broad relief for the plaintiff and a large number of others who 
are similarly situated (as in WRTL).136 In the election law con-
text as in others, courts will be called upon both to make excep-
tions for parties uniquely burdened by a particular law and at 
other times to void entire statutes (or large sections of them).  
Neither extreme position—that courts should only deal 
with such challenges facially or as-applied—is tenable or desir-
able. Thus, while tentatively suggesting that the Court ought to 
lower the bar for facial challenges in election law cases, we 
mean to say that broader relief beyond that narrowly tailored 
to a plaintiff ’s circumstances ought ordinarily to be available. 
The need for clear pre-election rules and the drawbacks of de-
ciding legal issues only when the candidate or party who might 
benefit is well-known argues against the ordinary hesitancy of 
courts to avoid constitutional questions before ascertaining the 
precise scope of potential injuries. Even though we would advo-
cate greater judicial rulemaking, as opposed to exception-
carving, we recognize that reasonable disagreement exists as to 
whether courts should be more protective of democracy-related 
rights or more deferential to state laws regulating elections. 
For those who believe that checking the burdens on minority 
parties, speakers, and voters remains the central constitutional 
goal in evaluating election law statutes, then the rules judges 
create in this realm should reflect greater concern for the “ex-
 
 136. See supra Part III.A. 
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ceptional” cases of those who shoulder the disproportionate 
weight of such laws. 
Because the constitutional law of elections represents a 
family of doctrines sometimes only loosely connected by their 
relationship to the proper functioning of American democracy, 
it is somewhat difficult to argue for a sweeping “election law 
exception” to the general principles governing facial and as-
applied challenges. We do not and could not argue that any 
constitutional question touching on elections must be given the 
most capacious answer by judges irrespective of statutory con-
text. Moreover, it may be the case that in some election law 
domains the concerns expressed above are less present than in 
others. In the realm of campaign finance, for example, the cost 
of piecemeal adjudication has not deterred public interest or-
ganizations and parties from launching a series of as-applied 
challenges.137 But when those characteristically election-
related concerns are present, the courts ought to relax the bur-
dens on facial challenges that exist in the ordinary case. 
Beyond a modest shift in presumptions in favor of consider-
ing an election law’s facial validity, however, we would also ad-
vocate something akin to “substantial overbreadth” analysis in 
many election law contexts. Space constraints prevent a de-
tailed explication here, but as explained earlier in this Article, 
it remains a puzzle why the Court did not seem to conduct such 
an analysis in the First Amendment election contexts of cam-
paign finance138 and party associational rights.139 In a case 
challenging barriers to voting, moreover, something like over-
breadth analysis seems unavoidable. The inquiry in Crawford, 
as in any similar case, boils down to whether the state can jus-
tify the likelihood that a certain number of voters will find it 
difficult or impossible to vote because of the law. Although “how 
many voters?” and “how difficult?” remain the important ques-
tions under any inquiry, the Court must decide whether the 
state interests justify the disproportionate burden placed on a 
minority of potential voters. That question can rarely be ans-
wered by saying that the burdened voters ought to bring as-
applied challenges: poll taxes are not unconstitutional as ap-
 
 137. See, e.g., Persily, supra note 1 (manuscript at 15–18). 
 138. See id. 
 139. See, e.g., Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1195 n.10 (holding that the 
statute was constitutional under the First Amendment because “[it] does not 
require the parties to reproduce another’s speech against their will, nor does it 
co-opt the parties’ own conduits for speech”). 
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plied only to poor people, and literacy tests would not be un-
constitutional (if at all)140 as applied only to illiterate people. 
The prerequisite to voting is either justifiable—in the abstract 
and given the recognized potential to prevent some from vot-
ing—as a proper means of serving some state interest or not. 
V.  EPILOGUE   
The Supreme Court is currently considering an challenge 
to the constitutionality of Section Five of the newly reautho-
rized Voting Rights Act (VRA) in Northwest Austin Municipal 
Utility District Number One v. Mukasey (“NAMUDNO”).141 
That provision requires “covered jurisdictions” to receive feder-
al permission for changes to laws concerning voting.142 Section 
Five was passed to constrain certain jurisdictions, particularly 
but not exclusively in the South, from enacting racially discri-
minatory election laws.143 The Court will now consider whether 
the law is unconstitutional on its face or as-applied to the 
plaintiff, a municipal utility district in Austin, Texas. The utili-
ty district argues that the law exceeds congressional power un-
der Section Two of the Fifteenth Amendment144 and Section 
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment145 if it is read to cover a 
small jurisdiction with no history of racial discrimination in 
voting. Although the district court rejected both facial and as-
applied challenges to the statute, the utility district has now 
largely abandoned its as-applied argument and described its 
challenge to the Supreme Court as primarily a facial one. 
Because it is based on a federalism argument challenging 
congressional power, the NAMUDNO case differs from the as-
applied challenges the Court has considered in WRTL, Wash-
ington State Grange, and Crawford.146 Unlike those cases, the 
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plaintiff here does not allege that the law places a unique bur-
den on its constitutionally guaranteed rights, per se. Rather, 
the petitioner in NAMUDNO argues that the law is particular-
ly unjustified as applied to it, so much so that Congress does 
not have the power to capture this jurisdiction within the regu-
latory reach of the law.147 Under this view of the Enforcement 
Clauses of the post-Civil War Amendments, Congress may not 
pass a law that unfairly groups jurisdictions with and without 
histories of discrimination in voting rights. 
The district court rejected the utility district’s as-applied 
challenge on several grounds.148 First, the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in City of Rome v. United States rejected a similar as-
applied claim to the earlier incarnation of the VRA brought by 
a city that disclaimed any history of discrimination in voting 
rights.149 The district court read Rome to hold that “where, as 
here, Congress has compiled a sufficient legislative record to 
defeat a facial constitutional challenge . . . an as-applied chal-
lenge based on a political subunit’s record of nondiscrimination 
must also fail.”150 Second, even if Congress must provide a more 
focused jurisdiction-based justification for coverage—a position 
never taken by the Court’s majority—the relevant unit for 
identifying discrimination would be the state, not each locality 
within it.151 Otherwise, Congress could never compile a suffi-
ciently comprehensive record of discrimination by every af-
fected governmental body to justify prophylactic civil rights leg-
islation.152 In the case of the VRA, Congress at least provided 
examples of voting rights violations for each of the covered 
states, even if not for each of the hundreds of governmental 
sub-units within them.153 Finally, Congress acts as a national 
policymaker when it enacts prophylactic or remedial civil rights 
legislations. Its findings are necessarily national in scope, not 
tailored to every single jurisdiction affected by the proposed 
law. 
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The structure of the VRA also provides its own administra-
tive analog to as-applied challenges. Through its “bailout” pro-
visions154 the VRA allows jurisdictions to escape coverage by 
proving in court their record of good behavior with respect to 
minority voting rights for the previous ten years.155 Therefore, 
if a covered jurisdiction considers itself unjustifiably burdened 
by the requirement of preclearance, it can sue for bailout in the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. To do so does 
not require a showing that the law is unconstitutional as-
applied to the jurisdiction, just that its recent record of beha-
vior with respect to voting rights has proven that coverage is 
unwarranted. 
Recognizing this potential avenue of relief, the plaintiff in 
NAMUDNO asked, in the alternative, that bailout be made 
available to it.156 Under the statute, however, only jurisdictions 
that register voters have the status requisite for bailout.157 Nei-
ther the state of Texas, nor Travis County, has sought bai-
lout.158 In fact, Travis County, where the municipal utility dis-
trict is located, has intervened in opposition to the district’s 
constitutional challenge to the VRA.159 Therefore, the utility 
district, in effect, is asking the Court to reinterpret the notion 
of covered jurisdictions so as to avoid the alleged constitutional 
difficulties that such broad coverage presents. 
Because striking down the VRA on its face would represent 
a tectonic shift in federal court review of congressional power to 
enforce civil rights, a Court that is skeptical of the VRA’s con-
stitutionality might gravitate toward some version of an as-
applied challenge. The NAMUDNO case would be the wrong 
vehicle for the Court to take such a stand. Striking down the 
statute as applied to a subjurisdiction or allowing it to bailout 
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would not represent mere tinkering at the edges of the VRA re-
gime. Editing the statute in this way cuts to the heart of what 
Congress was trying to do when it developed a coverage formu-
la that was well-known to be both over- and under-inclusive. 
Congress considered the statute necessary to capture most of 
the worst offenders of minority voting rights. Such a ruling 
would have implications for other civil rights laws by effectively 
carving out exceptions for any jurisdiction for which findings of 
discrimination have not been made.  
For a Court uncomfortable with the depth and breadth of 
the statute’s regulation of states and localities, another quasi-
as-applied challenge is available. The Court could wait until a 
qualified jurisdiction attempts to bail out and then read the 
bailout requirements in such a way as to avoid constitutional 
difficulty. Because very few jurisdictions have attempted to bail 
out and none have been refused since 1982,160 we do not know 
how high the bar for bailout really is. If and when a jurisdiction 
on the margin is refused bailout, then the Court can reconsider 
whether those criteria are unduly burdensome. Only when a 
jurisdiction attempts to do so, however, could the Court carve 
out what constitutes an as-applied exception to the general sta-
tutory scheme. Just as the Court recrafted the standard for ex-
press advocacy in WRTL,161 it could “edit” the bailout provi-
sions to make it somewhat easier to escape Section Five 
coverage. 
Moreover, if the Court is concerned by the federalism costs 
of the new VRA, it could read the new retrogression standard 
in such a way as to make preclearance more likely. Under the 
reauthorized VRA, a jurisdiction will be denied preclearance 
from the Attorney General or the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia if its proposed voting law has the purpose 
or effect of “diminishing the ability of” minority voters “to elect 
their preferred candidates of choice.”162 The preclearance stan-
dard represents the true burden, if any, on the covered jurisdic-
tions. Coverage, by itself, which is the source of the complaint 
in NAMUDNO, only raises federalism concerns if jurisdictions 
have a legitimate fear that their voting laws will not be allowed 
to go into effect. If, in operation, the standard pushes the con-
stitutional envelope by denying preclearance to voting laws 
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that are usually constitutional, then the Court can either vindi-
cate as-applied challenges to that standard or, more likely, 
simply interpret it narrowly enough to assuage concerns about 
the burdens it places on states’ rights. 
Each of these avenues of relief is reminiscent of the paths 
the Court has taken in Washington State Grange and Craw-
ford, when it rejected a facial challenge while leaving open the 
door to future as-applied challenges. Just as in those cases the 
Court raised what seemed like ripeness concerns in the context 
of its discussion of facial challenges, the NAMUDNO case 
comes to the Court without a firm record as to how the new 
VRA will work in practice. Just as the Court wanted to wait 
until the ballot in Washington confused voters or the voter ID 
law disenfranchised an identifiable group of people, so too in 
NAMUDNO should it wait to see the extent of the burden the 
new VRA places on covered jurisdictions. If it turns out that the 
law unduly restricts covered jurisdictions in their enforcement 
of clearly constitutional voting laws, then the Court can consid-
er an as-applied challenge in those enforcement contexts. 
